We consider a Cournot duopoly under general demand and cost functions, where an incumbent patentee has a cost reducing technology that it can license to its rival by using combinations of royalties and upfront fees (two-part tariffs). We show that for drastic technologies: (a) licensing occurs and both firms stay active if the cost function is superadditive and (b) licensing does not occur and the patentee monopolizes the market if the cost function is additive or subadditive. For non drastic technologies, licensing takes place provided the average efficiency gain from the cost reducing technology is higher than the marginal gain computed at the licensee's reservation output. Optimal licensing policies have both royalties and fees for significantly superior technologies if the cost function is superadditive. By contrast, for additive and certain subadditive cost functions, optimal licensing policies have only royalties and no fees.
Introduction
A patent grants an innovator monopoly rights over an innovation for a given period of time. It seeks to provide incentives to innovate as well as to diffuse innovations. Licensing is a standard way of diffusion of innovations. Initiated by Arrow (1962) , the study of different aspects of patent licensing has constituted an important area of modern industrial economics. Comparing a monopoly with a perfectly competitive industry, Arrow argued that perfect competition provides a higher incentive to innovate. Licensing in oligopolies was first studied by Tauman (1984, 1986 ) and Shapiro (1985, 1986) . Since then, the literature has been extended to address issues such as informational asymmetries (Gallini and Wright 1990; Choi 2001) , product differentiation (Muto 1993 In spite of its richness, the existing literature has been restrictive in regard to one important aspect of production: return to scale. The vast majority of the papers in the literature assume that firms operate under linear cost functions. 1 The current paper seeks to expand the literature by studying licensing between rival firms operating under general cost functions. Our motivation is based on theoretical and also on empirical grounds. On the one hand, we are interested in seeing how the general properties of cost functions (e.g., subadditivity, superadditivity) affect licensing policies, in particular the diffusion of new technologies and the optimal combination of fees and royalties. On the other hand, empirical data shows that licensing policies vary from industry to industry. Given that modern industries differ also in the degree of returns to scale in production, our second goal is to bring forward the latter as a empirical factor that potentially interacts with actual licensing policies. 2 We carry out our analysis in a Cournot duopoly with a general demand function. Initially both competing firms produce under the same cost function. One of the firms obtains a patent on a technological innovation that changes this cost function. The patentee firm can either use the new technology exclusively or license it to its rival. The licensing policies available to the patentee consist of all combinations of linear royalties and upfront fees (two-part tariffs). The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows:
1. A drastic technology 3 is licensed and both firms are active in the market if the cost function resulting from the new technology is superadditive. If the cost function is additive or subadditive, then a drastic technology is not licensed and the patentee becomes a monopolist.
functions. For additive cost functions, licensing involves only royalties and no fees and the same conclusion holds for subadditive functions under certain additional assumptions.
To see the basic intuition behind these findings, consider first a drastic technology. Under subadditivity (increasing returns to scale), the maximum profit attainable in the industry is the monopoly profit. As the patentee can become a monopolist by exclusively using a drastic technology, it has no incentive to license such a technology to its rival. Under superadditivity (decreasing returns), the monopoly profit might no longer be the maximum attainable profit. In this case higher cost efficiency, and consequently higher industry profit, is achieved when both firms are active. As a result, licensing occurs and the market is not monopolized.
In the case of a non drastic technology, there is a specific rate of royalty that induces a market equilibrium which replicates the equilibrium under no licensing (i.e., market prices are the same under the two regimes). Under this royalty, the market profit of the patentee is the same as its profit under no licensing. Adding the royalty revenues tilts the scale in favor of licensing. The assumption that the average efficiency gain from the new technology is higher than the marginal gain guarantees that the licensee accepts this policy.
Optimal royalties are determined by two factors. First, the patentee intends to create a relatively inefficient rival and second, it has to consider how the rival's efficiency affects its own marginal cost. Under increasing returns to scale, these two factors work in the same direction. A less efficient rival implies larger output and lower marginal cost for the patentee. Hence, the patentee has incentives to restrict the rival's output under increasing returns, which is achieved by setting higher royalties. Under decreasing returns, the two factors do not work in the same direction, as creating a less efficient rival results in larger output and higher marginal cost for the patentee. For this reason the patentee is inclined to set lower royalties (and higher fees) under decreasing returns.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The results are derived in section 3. The last section concludes.
The model
Consider a Cournot duopoly with firms 1 and 2. For i = 1, 2, let q i ≥ 0 be the quantity produced by firm i and Q = q 1 + q 2 be the industry output. Let p(Q) : R + → R + be the price function or the inverse demand function. We assume A1 There exists Q 0 > 0 such that (i) p(Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Q 0 and (ii) for Q ∈ [0, Q 0 ), p(Q) is positive and twice continuously differentiable with p (Q) < 0, that is, p(Q) is decreasing for Q ∈ [0, Q 0 ).
The set of all feasible technologies is S = [0, ε]. The total cost of producing q units under technology ε ∈ S is given by c ε (q) : R + → R + . A higher ε corresponds to a better technology and has a lower cost of production. Specifically we assume A3 For every ε ∈ S: (i) c ε (0) = 0, (ii) c ε (q) is twice continuously differentiable 5 with c ε (q) > 0 for q > 0, that is, c ε (q) is increasing in q, and (iii) p(0) > c ε (0). A4 For any q > 0, both the total cost c ε (q) and the marginal cost c ε (q) are decreasing and differentiable in ε. 5 At q = 0, we consider the right derivative for both functions p and c ε .
A5 For every
Initially both firms produce under the least efficient technology 0 ∈ S and have cost c 0 (q). Firm 1 has a patent for a superior technology ε ∈ (0, ε] that results in cost function c ε (q). Firm 1 produces with the new technology. It may also license this technology to its rival firm 2. The set of licensing policies we consider is the set of all combinations of royalties and upfront fees (two-part tariffs) of the form (r, α) where r ≥ 0 is a unit royalty and α ≥ 0 is an upfront fee.
A1-A5 are standard assumptions which guarantee uniqueness and stability of Cournot equilibrium (see, e.g., Gaudet 
Cost functions
In this paper we consider three classes of cost functions: superadditive, subadditive and additive. Superadditivity represents production technologies characterized by decreasing returns to scale in production whereas subadditivity represents increasing returns. Additivity corresponds to constant returns.
Definition 1 For ε ∈ S, the cost function c ε is superadditive if c ε (q + q) > c ε (q) + c ε ( q) for all q, q > 0 and it is subadditive if c ε (q + q) < c ε (q) + c ε ( q) for all q, q > 0.
Remark 1 If c(q)
: R + → R + is a convex (concave) function with c(0) = 0, then it is superadditive (subadditive) but the converse is not true. Consider the function c(q) defined on q ≥ 0 as c(q) = q exp(−1/q 2 ) for q > 0 and c(0) = 0. This function is superadditive, but not convex. 6 Definition 2 For ε ∈ S, the cost function c ε is additive if it satisfies Cauchy's basic equation
Remark 2 If an additive function c ε is continuous at a point, then ∃ k ε such that
For the proof, see Theorem 1, p.34 of Aczél (1966) . By (1) and A3 it follows that if a technology ε has additive cost function, then c ε (q) = k ε > 0. An additive cost function thus results in constant marginal cost of production. If the initial technology 0 and the new technology ε both have additive cost functions, then the magnitude of the cost reduction from the new technology for every unit of production is k 0 − k ε > 0. This case has been extensively studied in the literature of patent licensing (see, e.g., Wang 1998; Sen and Tauman 2007).
The following lemma provides a useful characterization of three different classes of cost functions in terms of marginal costs. 3 The licensing game G The strategic interaction between the two firms is modeled as an extensive-form game G that has three stages. In the first stage, firm 1 decides whether to license the new technology ε to firm 2 or not. If firm 1 decides to license, it offers firm 2 a licensing policy (r, α). In the second stage, firm 2 decides whether to accept or reject any licensing policy offered. Finally, in the third stage the two firms simultaneously choose quantities q 1 , q 2 in the Cournot duopoly.
If firm 2 has a license of technology ε under a policy (r, α), it pays firm 1 the upfront fee α and in addition pays royalty r for every unit it produces. If firm 2 does not have a license, it produces with technology 0. Let λ be the indicator variable with λ = 1 if firm 2 has a license and λ = 0 if it does not. The payoff functions of firms 1, 2 (these are functions of (r, α), λ, q 1 , q 2 ) in the game G are
We determine Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of G. Working backwards, we begin with the Cournot stage of this game and then move to the initial stages.
Cournot stage
Consider the third stage of G where firms compete in quantities. For i = 1, 2, let π i be the duopoly profit of firm i in the Counrot stage. From (2), we have
To find SPNE of G, for every r ≥ 0 and λ ∈ {0, 1}, we need to determine Nash equilibrium (NE) of the corresponding Cournot duopoly where firms 1, 2 choose q 1 , q 2 to obtain profits given by 7 (3). As the cost functions of both firms satisfy A3-A5, existence and uniqueness of NE of the Cournot duopoly is guaranteed under both cases of licensing and no licensing. The notion of drastic techn! ology (Arrow 1962) will be useful for our analysis.
Definition 3
The new technology is drastic if it is significant enough to create a monopoly when only one firm uses it; otherwise, it is non drastic.
Remark 3
To characterize drastic technologies, consider the monopoly problem. For any ε ∈ S, let φ ε (q) := p(q)q − c ε (q) denote the profit function of a monopolist who faces inverse demand p(Q) and produces under cost c ε (Q). By A1-A5, φ ε (q) is concave in q and the monopoly problem max q≥0 φ ε (q) has a unique solution. Denote this solution by q m ε (the monopoly output). Let p m ε = p(q m ε ) be the monopoly price and π m ε = φ ε (q m ε ) be the monopoly profit. A1-A5 also ensure that q m ε is increasing (and hence p m ε is decreasing) in ε. Lemma 2 describes the key features of Cournot equilibrium under the two cases of licensing and no licensing.
Lemma 2 For all ε ∈ S, r ≥ 0 and λ ∈ {0, 1}, the Cournot duopoly has a unique NE. For i = 1, 2, let q i ε , π i ε denote NE (Cournot) output, profit of firm i when firm 2 does not have a license and let
, Q ε (r) be the corresponding expressions when firm 2 has a license with royalty r. 
Consequently a technology ε ∈ S is drastic if p m ε ≤ c 0 (0) and it is non drastic otherwise. Moreover, q 1 ε , π 1 ε , Q ε are increasing in ε and for non drastic technologies q 2 ε , π 2 ε are decreasing in ε.
(ii) Suppose firm 2 has a license with royalty r ≥ 0. There exists r ε ≡ p m ε − c ε (0) > 0 such that if r < r ε , then q 1 ε (r), q 2 ε (r) are both positive and if r ≥ r ε , then q 1 ε (r) = q m ε , q 2 ε (r) = 0. Moreover, q 1 ε (r), π 1 ε (r) are increasing and q 2 ε (r), π 2 ε (r), Q ε (r) are decreasing in r for r ≤ r ε .
(iii) For any non drastic technology ε, there are royalties r ε , r * ε ∈ (0, r ε ) such that π 2 ε (r) π 2 ε ⇔ r r ε and q 2 ε (r) q 2 ε ⇔ r r * ε . Moreover q 1 ε (r * ε ) = q 1 ε and Q ε (r * ε ) = Q ε .
Proof See the Appendix. Lemma 2 characterizes Cournot equilibrium and delivers the standard comparative statics results. When there is no licensing, expectedly the quantity of firm 1 increases in the quality of the new technology ε. Our assumptions guarantee that standard effects will then follow: A2 implies that best-replies are negatively sloped, hence quantity of firm 2 falls in ε. A5 implies that the net effect of ε on industry output is positive.
When there is licensing with royalty r, expectedly q 2 ε (r) (whenever positive) falls in r. Then A2 implies that q 1 ε (r) increases in r and A5 implies that the net effect of r on industry output Q ε (r) is negative. The last part of the lemma identifies two specific thresholds of royalties: one that equates firm 2's Cournot profits with and without a license and the other one that equates its Cournot outputs. These thresholds will be useful to determine licensing policies that are acceptable to firm 2.
Since p m 0 > c 0 (0), it follows by Lemma 2 that the initial technology 0 is non drastic. Note that p m ε is continuous and decreasing in ε. Henceforth we assume that
. This ensures that sets of non drastic and drastic technologies are both non empty. Any technology ε < ε D is non drastic and ε ≥ ε D is drastic.
Technology transfer stages
Given the analysis of the previous section, we next move to the initial stages of G. If firm 2 accepts a licensing policy (r, α), the payoff Π 1 ε (r, α) of firm 1 is the sum of its duopoly profit and licensing revenue. For firm 2, note from (3) that royalty payments are already included as part of cost in its duopoly profit. So firm 2's payoff Π 2 ε (r, α) is its duopoly profit net of upfront fee. Using the equilibrium values of profits and quantities from Lemma 2, we have
By Lemma 2, if firm 2 rejects the licensing policy, it obtains π 2 ε . Hence for any r, it is optimal for firm 1 to set the fee α equal to α ε (r) := π 2 ε (r) − π 2 ε making firm 2 just indifferent between accepting and rejecting the licensing offer. 8 Therefore, if firm 1 decides to offer a license, its problem reduces to choose r ≥ 0 to maximize
8 If royalty r is such that π 2 ε (r) < π 2 ε , then even with zero fee firm 2's payoff with a license is lower than its payoff without a license. As upfront fees are non-negative, such a royalty will not be accepted by firm 2. By Lemma 2(iii), it follows that any licensing policy with royalty r > r ε is not acceptable to firm 2.
On the other hand, if firm 1 does not offer a license, it obtains π 1 ε . We are now in a position to determine optimal licensing policies for firm 1.
Optimal licensing policies
The following general result shows that royalties must be positive whenever licensing occurs.
Proposition 1 If firm 1 offers a license to firm 2, it is always optimal to set a positive royalty.
Proof See the Appendix.
Remark 4 Proposition 1 holds under A1-A5 without any further assumptions. However, setting a positive royalty may not necessarily be optimal for a patentee firm when it competes in an oligopoly of size n ≥ 3. In the duopoly model firm 2's reservation payoff π 2 ε (i.e., its payoff when it does not have a license) is independent of the rate of royalty r. But in an oligopoly of general size, if a specific firm is without a license, some other firms might have a license; so the reservation payoff of a non-licensee does depend on r. This may lead to a conclusion different from Proposition 1 (see, e.g., Sen and Tauman 2007).
Further characterization of optimal licensing policies depends on whether the new technology is drastic or non drastic.
Drastic technologies
Consider a drastic technology ε. For this case, if firm 2 does not have a license it exits the market and firm 1 becomes a monopolist, i.e., π 2 ε = 0 and π 1 ε = π m ε . Proposition 2 shows that firm 1's decision to license or not depends crucially on the nature of new technology. It should be also noted that these results do not require any additional assumption on the initial technology 0 apart from A3-A5. (III) If c ε (q) is superadditive and c ε (q m ε ) > c ε (0), then licensing occurs. 9 Any optimal licensing policy has positive royalty and upfront fee. Both firms are active and firm 1 obtains more than π m ε .
Proof Firm 2's net payoff under any optimal licensing policy is its payoff without a license: π 2 ε . Since π 2 ε = 0 for a drastic technology ε, (I) follows. For (II)-(III), note that by not offering a license, firm 1 obtains the monopoly profit π m ε . By Lemma 2(ii), offering a license with royalty r ≥ r ε for a drastic technology ε results in the same outcome as not offering a license. So it is sufficient to consider licensing policies with r ∈ [0, r ε ). In that case both firms produce positive outputs.
(II) Let c ε (q) be subadditive or additive. Taking π 2 ε = 0 in (4), for r ∈ [0, r ε ), we have
9 Superaddivity and c ε (0) = 0 already imply c ε (q) ≥ c ε (0) for all q > 0 (see Lemma 1) . The inequality in the proposition requires the marginal cost at the monopoly output q m ε to be different from that at 0.
where the first inequality is strict if c ε (q) subadditive and holds with equality if c ε (q) is additive. The second inequality is due to the fact that the monopolist's profit is maximized at q m ε and Q ε (r) < q m ε for r ∈ [0, r ε ) (Lemma 2(ii)). (III) Let c ε (q) be superadditive and c ε (q m ε ) > c ε (0). Then Π 1 ε (r) is decreasing at r = r ε (see Lemma A3 of Appendix). Together with Proposition 1, this implies that it is optimal for firm 1 to license and any optimal policy must have r ∈ (0, r ε ) and upfront fee π 2 ε (r) − π 2 ε = π 2 ε (r) > 0. As Π 1 ε (r) = π m ε for r ≥ r ε , under any optimal policy firm 1 obtains more than π m ε . Under additivity or subadditivity of the new technology (constant or increasing returns to scale), the maximum achievable payoff is the monopoly profit π m ε . Since firm 1 can obtain the monopoly profit by using a drastic technology exclusively, licensing does not occur. Under superadditivity (decreasing returns), the monopoly profit is no longer the upper bound of industry profit, as production of output by a single firm creates cost inefficiencies. For this case firm 1 has an incentive to keep firm 2 active in the market. The presence of two active firms increases efficiency and results in higher surplus than the monopoly profit, which firm 1 extracts via a fee.
We note that the result that a firm might sell a drastic technology to its rival has been obtained in a different context by Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) who analyzed licensing in a differentiated goods duopoly under constant returns to scale. In that framework, a patentee transfers a drastic technology to its rival as it does not want to close the rival's profitable market. Proposition 2 brings forward an alternative motive of licensing of a drastic technology, namely, cost efficiency under decreasing returns.
Non drastic technologies
To characterize optimal licensing policies for a non drastic technology ε, let F (q) := c 0 (q) − c ε (q). Note by A4 that F (q), F (q) are both positive for any q > 0. F (q) represents the total gain in efficiency for q units obtained from the superior technology ε. Accordingly, F (q)/q stands for the average gain and F (q) the marginal gain. For q > 0, define
The function H(q) is the ratio of average and marginal gains in efficiency obtained from using the superior technology ε. Recall the two threshold levels of royalties r * ε , r ε from Lemma 2(iii). At r = r * ε , the Cournot outputs of firms coincide with their no-licensing levels and at r = r ε , the Cournot profit of firm 2 equals its profit without a license. For a licensing policy with royalty r, the maximum upfront fee is α ε (r) = π 2 ε (r) − π 2 ε . A policy (r, α ε (r)) is acceptable to firm 2 if and only if r ∈ [0, r ε ]. Lemma 3 utilizes the function H(q) together with r * ε , r ε to determine values of royalties that make a licensing agreement beneficial for both firms.
Lemma 3
The following hold for a non drastic technology ε.
e., for firm 1, licensing under policy (r * ε , α(r * ε )) yields a higher payoff than the no licensing.
(ii) Suppose H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1. Then r * ε ≤ r ε and consequently there exist licensing policies acceptable to firm 2 in which firm 1 obtains a higher payoff than no licensing.
At r = r * ε , the Cournot profit of firm 1 is the same as its profit under no licensing, but it obtains additional licensing revenue, yielding a surplus for firm 1. Whether firm 2 also obtains a surplus there depends on the inequality H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1, which says that the marginal efficiency gain obtained from the new technology is lower than the average gain when both are computed at firm 2's Cournot output without a license. As licensing with r = r * ε results in same Cournot outputs and price as no licensing, firm 2's Cournot profit is higher under licensing if and only if its total cost is lower under licensing, i.e.,
Since r * ε = F ( q 2 ε ) (see the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix), it follows that π 2 (r * ε ) ≥ π 2 ε ⇔ H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1. In particular this inequality implies that the unit royalty does not exceed the average gain in efficiency from the superior technology. This ensures that licensing under royalty r * ε leaves a surplus to firm 2.
Additive and superadditive cost functions
Using the condition H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1, we can characterize optimal licensing policies for additive and superadditive cases.
Proposition 3 Consider a non drastic technology ε, i.e., ε ∈ (0, ε D ). If H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1, then licensing occurs. The optimal licensing policies have the following properties.
(I) If c ε (q) is additive, then the unique optimal licensing policy for firm 1 has royalty r = r ε and zero upfront fee, i.e., it is a pure royalty policy.
, any optimal licensing policy for firm 1 has both positive royalty as well as positive upfront fee.
Note from (1) that if c ε (q) is additive, then c ε (q) = k ε q. If the initial technology 0 also has an additive cost function, then c 0 (q) = k 0 q. In that case for any q > 0, we have F (q) = F (q)/q = k 0 − k ε and H(q) = 1. Therefore the condition H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1 holds for the standard case studied in the literature where both new and initial technologies have constant returns. The conclusion of part (I) is the same as the result of Sen and Tauman (2007) for a Cournot duopoly with an incumbent patentee.
Observe that ε D is the threshold that separates non drastic and drastic technologies. Part (II) of the proposition shows that if technology ε D has a superadditive cost function, then for all sufficiently significant non drastic technologies (i.e., technologies ε that are close enough to ε D ) any optimal policy has both royalty and upfront fee.
Subadditive cost functions
When c ε (q) is subadditive, the condition H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1 alone is not enough to characterize optimal licensing policies. 10 More structure on the cost function is needed.
Note that interval-wise decreasing property at x 0 implies f (x) < f (y) if x < x 0 < y, but it does not specify any order between f (x), f (y) when x, y are both lower (or both higher) than x 0 . We shall use this concept to impose further structure on a cost function. Note from Lemma 2 that when there is licensing with zero royalty, both firms produce the same Cournot output. Denote this output by q ε (0) and note that q 2 ε (r) < q ε (0) < q 1 ε (r) for any r > 0. Proposition 4 shows that optimal licensing policies can be completely characterized if the marginal cost function c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at 11 q ε (0). Before stating th! e proposition, it will be useful to see the implications of interval-wise decreasing property of the marginal cost function. Lemma 4 The following hold if c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q ε (0).
(i) c ε (q) cannot be additive or superadditive.
(ii) For any r ∈ (0, r ε ), c ε (q 1 ε (r) + q 2 ε (r)) < c ε (q 1 ε (r)) + c ε (q 2 ε (r)).
Proof (i) Since c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q ε (0) > 0, we have c ε (0) > c ε (q ε (0)). Then by Lemma 1 it follows that c ε (q) cannot be additive or superadditive.
(ii) We drop subscript ε for brevity. Recall from Lemma 2(ii) that for r ∈ (0, r), 0 < q 2 (r) < q(0) < q 1 (r). Since c (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q(0), we have c (x) > c (q(0)) for x < q 2 (r) and c (x) < c (q(0)) for x > q 1 (r)
c (x)dx, which is lower
c (q(0))dx = 0. This completes the proof.
Lemma 4 shows that if c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q ε (0), then c ε (q) is outside the set of superadditive and additive functions and the "subaddivity inequality" c ε (q + q) < c ε (q) + c ε ( q) holds for all pairs (q, q) that arise as Cournot equilibrium under any licensing policy.
Proposition 4 Consider a non drastic technology ε. Suppose H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1 and c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q ε (0). Then the unique optimal licensing policy for firm 1 has royalty r = r ε and zero upfront fee, i.e., it is a pure royalty policy. Proof See the Appendix.
In particular, if c ε (q) is subadditive and satisfies the conditions of Proposition 4, then pure royalty emerges as the unique optimal licensing policy. Putting together the results of Propositions 3 and 4, the general conclusion is that for non drastic technologies a patentee licenses to its rival by setting the maximum possible royalty and zero upfront fee for constant or increasing returns (subject to some additional structure on the cost function). By contrast, for decreasing returns, royalties are set lower and there are positive fees.
The result that royalties tend to be higher under increasing returns seems to be consistent with some real life observations on royalty rates in various industries. A recent survey by Held and Parker (2011) computed the average royalty rates in some major industries in USA and Canada for the period 2008-2011. The higher average royalty rates were found in sectors such us aerospace (commercial and military), transportation and information technology & equipment, i.e., sectors usually associated with increasing returns to scale. Of course, one needs to look at industry-specific data for a better understanding of the observed licensing policies. Still, some sort of association between returns to scale and optimal licensing policies seems to be in place.
Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed optimal licensing policies of a cost-reducing innovation in a market with general cost functions. In a Cournot duopoly with one of the firms as a patentee, we have derived a fairly complete characterization of licensing policies under a general setting. We have shown that if licensing occurs, then royalties must be positive (Proposition 1), licensing of drastic technologies depends on whether the cost function generated by the new technology is superadditive or subadditive (Proposition 2), licensing of non drastic technologies depends on the relation between the marginal and average efficiency gains obtained from the superior technology (Proposition 3), for significantly superior technologies, superadditivity ensures that fees are positive (Proposition 3) and subadditivity or additivity results in maximum possible royalty and zero fees (Propositions 3,4).
In conclusion, we suggest some extensions. The analysis of licensing in a market with n ≥ 3 firms operating under general cost functions is the most natural direction for future work. Another interesting direction is to consider markets where firms compete in prices under nonconstant returns. This case is interesting not only for licensing but also from a market equilibrium viewpoint: it is known that a multiplicity of price equilibria emerges when two firms operate in homogeneous goods markets under decreasing returns (Dastidar 1995) . The introduction of licensing changes the objective function of the incumbent patentee in the price stage of the game from
denotes the demand function of firm i and p i denotes the price set by firm i. It will be interesting to see how this modification of the objective function affects the set of price equilibria. see how firm 1's profit changes with respect to technology ε in the case when firm 2 does not have the new technology, we take i = 2, j = 1 and t = ε and (b) to see how firm 2's profit as licensee changes with respect to royalty r, we take i = 1, j = 2 and t = r.
Lemma A1 Denote g q (t) := ∂γ t (q)/∂t and h q (t) := ∂γ t (q)/∂t (i) If h q (t) > 0 for all q > 0, then q i (t), π i (t) are increasing and q j (t), Q(t) are decreasing in t.
(ii) If h q (t) < 0 for all q > 0, then q i (t), π i (t) are decreasing and q j (t), Q(t) are increasing in t.
(iii) If g q (t) > 0, h q (t) > 0 for all q > 0, then π j (t) is decreasing in t; if g q (t) < 0, h q (t) < 0 for all q > 0, then π j (t) is increasing in t.
Proof Without loss of generality, let i = 1, j = 2. Note that
For i, j = 1, 2 and i = j, denote a i (q 1 , q 2 ) := ∂π 2 i /∂q 2 i , b i (q 1 , q 2 ) := ∂π 2 i /∂q i ∂q j . The Jacobian of the marginal profits is
From (7) and A2, A5,
By the uniqueness of the NE, (−1) 2 |J| = |J| > 0 (see, e.g., Dixit 1986; Dastidar 2000).
As both firms produce positive output in the unique NE (q 1 (t), q 2 (t)), using first order conditions (f.o.c.) in (7), we have
Totally differentiating the above with respect to t and using the definition of h q t :
Solving this system of equations, we have
As a 1 < 0, b 1 < 0, a 1 −b 1 = p (Q(t))−τ (q 1 (t)) < 0 (by A5) and |J| > 0, by (8) , q 1 (t) > 0, q 2 (t) < 0 and Q (t) < 0 if h q t > 0 and the reverse inequalities holds if h q t < 0. Totally differentiating firm 1's NE profit π 1 (t) = p(Q(t))q 1 (t) − τ (q 1 (t)) with respect to t and using the f.o.c. of firm 1, we have π 1 (t) = [∂π 1 /∂q 2 ]q 2 (t) = p (Q(t))q 1 (t)q 2 (t). Since p < 0 and q 1 (t) > 0, it follows that sign[π 1 (t)] = −sign[q 2 (t)]. Hence π 1 (t) > 0 if h q t > 0 and π 1 (t) < 0 if h q t < 0. This completes the proof of (i)-(ii).
Totally differentiating firm 2's NE profit π 2 (t) = p(Q(t))q 2 (t) − γ t (q 2 (t)) with respect to t, using the f.o.c. of firm 2 and the definition of g
. As p < 0 and q 2 (t) > 0, it follows that (a) if g q t > 0 and h q t > 0, then q 1 (t) > 0 and hence π 2 (t) < 0 and (b) if g q t < 0 and h q t < 0, then q 1 (t) < 0 and hence π 2 (t) > 0. This completes the proof of (iii). Lemma A2 If firm 2 has a license with zero royalty, its Cournot output as well as profit are higher than their no-licensing levels.
Proof The result is immediate for a drastic technology. Consider a non drastic technology. Take i = 1, j = 2 in Lemma A1. Firm 1's cost is τ (q) = c ε (q). Compare two scenarios: (a) if firm 2 has a license with royalty r = 0, its cost is γ ε (q) = c ε (q) and (b) if 2 does not have a license, its cost is γ 0 (q) = c 0 (q). Hence firm 2's cost is γ t (q) = c t (q) where t = ε for (a) and t = 0 for (b). By Assumption A4 we have g q t < 0 and h2 , we have q 1 ε (r * ε ) = q 1 ε and hence Q ε (r * ε ) = Q ε . Lemma A3 Let ψ ε (r) := ∂Π 1 ε (r)/∂r. Denote by q ε (0) the Cournot output of each firm when there is licensing with zero royalty. For all ε ∈ S:
(ii) If c ε (q) is additive, then ψ ε (r) > 0 for all r ∈ [0, r ε ).
(iii) If c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q ε (0), then ψ ε (r) > 0 for all r ∈ [0, r ε ).
(iv) ψ ε (r ε ) ≤ 0 if c ε (q) is superadditive with strict inequality if and only if c ε (q m ε ) > c ε (0).
Proof (i) Differentiating (4) with respect to r, we have (suppressing the subscript ε in quantities and cost functions),
Using this above
When there is licensing with no royalty (r = 0), firms 1, 2 have the same Cournot output q(0) = Q(0)/2. Evaluating (9) at r = 0, we have
The first order condition of firm 1 in the Cournot duopoly has p (Q(r))q 1 (r) + p(Q(r)) − c (q 1 (r)) = 0, so that for r = 0, we have p (Q(0))
(ii) Let φ(q) = p(q)q − c(q) be the profit function of a monopolist. From (9), we have
As Q(r) > q m ε for r ∈ [0, r(ε)), we have φ (Q(r)) < 0. As Q(r) is decreasing in r, the first term of (10) is positive. If c(q) is additive, then c (q) = c (0) for all q > 0, so the second term of (10) is zero, proving that ψ ε (r) > 0.
(iii) Suppose c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q(0). Since q 2 (r) ≤ q(0) ≤ q 1 (r) for any r ∈ [0, r(ε)) and ∂q 2 (r)/∂r < 0 < ∂q 1 (r)/∂r, the second term of (10) is bounded below by [c (Q(r)) − c (q(0))]∂Q(r)/∂r. By Lemma 2(ii), we have Q(r) > Q(r ε ) = q m ε and q(0) = q 1 (0) < q 1 (r ε ) = q m ε . Hence Q(r) > q(0). Interval-wise decreasing property then implies c (Q(r)) < c (q(0)). As ∂Q(r)/∂r < 0, the second term of (10) is bounded below by zero. Since the first term is positive, we conclude that ψ ε (r) > 0.
(iv) Evaluating (10) at r = r ε (taking the derivative ∂Π 1 ε (r)/∂r from the left) and noting that Q(r ε ) = q 1 (r ε ) = q m ε and q 2 (r ε ) = 0, we have ψ ε (r ε ) = φ (q Proof of Proposition 1 Lemma A3(i) implies that Π 1 ε (r) is increasing at r = 0, which proves the result.
Proof of Lemma 3 (i) For brevity, we drop the subscript ε from all expressions except c ε . From (4) and by Lemma 2(iii), firm 1's payoff under the policy (r * , α(r * )) is Π 1 (r * ) = p( Q) Q − c ε ( q 1 ) − c ε ( q 2 ) − [p( Q) q 2 − c 0 ( q 2 )] = π 1 + [c 0 ( q 2 ) − c ε ( q 2 )] > π 1 .
(ii) The first order condition of firm 2 under no licensing implies p ( Q) q 2 + p( Q) − c 0 ( q 2 ) = 0. Since q 2 (r * ) = q 2 , Q(r * ) = Q, when there is licensing with r = r * , the first order condition of firm 2 implies p ( Q) q 2 +p( Q)−c ε ( q 2 )−r * = 0. From these two equations, we have r * = c 0 ( q 2 )−c ε ( q 2 ) = F ( q 2 ). Since π 2 (r * ) − π 2 = c 0 ( q 2 ) − c ε ( q 2 ) − r * q 2 = F ( q 2 ) − r * q 2 , using (6) and the value of r * we have π 2 (r * ) − π 2 = F ( q 2 )[1 − H( q 2 )]. Hence, if H( q 2 ) ≤ 1, then we have π 2 (r * ) ≥ π 2 = π 2 ( r) implying that r * ≤ r. The last part of (ii) follows from part (i).
Proof of Proposition 3
As H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1, we know from Lemma 3 that licensing occurs. As no r > r ε is acceptable to firm 2, consider licensing policies (r, α ε (r)) where r ∈ [0, r ε ].
(I) If c ε (q) is additive, then by Lemma A3 it follows that Π 1 ε (r) is increasing for r ∈ [0, r ε ], implying that the unique optimal licensing policy is to set r = r ε . The corresponding upfront fee is α( r ε ) = π 2 ε ( r ε ) − π 2 ε = π 2 ε − π 2 ε = 0. (II) To prove (II), note that π 2 ε (r) is decreasing for r ∈ [0, r ε ] and π 2 ε ( r ε ) = π 2 ε . If ε = ε D , then π 2 ε = π 2 ε (r ε D ) = 0 (since ε = ε D corresponds to a drastic technology). As π 2 ε ( r ε ) = π 2 ε , we have r ε D = r ε D .
Consider the function ψ ε (r) = ∂Π 1 ε (r)/∂r.
As r ε D = r ε D , by the continuity of ψ ε (r) with respect to ε we have lim
As Lemma A3 holds for all ε ∈ [0, ε], in particular it holds for ε = ε D . Under the conditions on c ε D (q), we have ψ ε D (r ε D ) < 0 and by (11) , so is lim ε↑ε D ψ ε ( r ε ). Consequently for all values of ε that are sufficiently close to ε D , we have ψ ε ( r ε ) < 0, i.e., ∃ 0 < ε < ε D such that for all ε ∈ ( ε, ε D ), we have ψ ε ( r ε ) < 0, implying that Π 1 ε (r) is decreasing at r = r ε . Hence it is optimal for firm 1 to choose r ∈ (0, r ε ). In that case, π 2 ε (r) > π 2 ε and the upfront fee is π 2 ε (r) − π 2 ε > 0. Proof of Proposition 4 As H( q 2 ε ) ≤ 1, we know from Lemma 3 that licensing occurs. As no r > r ε is acceptable to firm 2, consider licensing policies (r, α ε (r)) where r ∈ [0, r ε ]. If c ε (q) is interval-wise decreasing at q = q ε (0), then by Lemma A3 it follows that Π 1 ε (r) is increasing for r ∈ [0, r ε ], implying that the unique optimal licensing policy is to set r = r ε . The corresponding upfront fee is α( r ε ) = π 2 ε ( r ε ) − π 2 ε = π 2 ε − π 2 ε = 0.
